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Abstract
Recent nonlocality results support a new picture of reality built on
the ideas of John von Neumann.
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“Nonlocality gets more real”. This is the provocative title of a recent
report in Physics Today [1]. Three experiments are cited. All three confirm to
high accuracy the predictions of quantum theory in experiments that suggest
the occurrence of an instantaneous action over a large distance. The most
spectacular of the three experiments begins with the production of pairs
of photons in a lab in downtown Geneva. For some of these pairs, one
member is sent by optical fiber to the village of Bellevue, while the other
is sent to the town of Bernex. The two towns lie more than 10 kilometers
apart. Experiments on the arriving photons are performed in both villages at
essentially the same time. What is found is this: The observed connections
between the outcomes of these experiments defy explanation in terms of
ordinary ideas about the nature of the physical world on the scale of directly
observable objects. This conclusion is announced in opening sentence of the
Physical-Review-Letters report [2] that describes the experiment: “Quantum
theory is nonlocal”.
This observed effect is not just an academic matter. A possible appli-
cation of interest to the Swiss is this: The effect can be used in principle
to transfer banking records over large distances in a secure way [3]. But
of far greater importance to physicists is its relevance to two fundamental
questions: What is the nature of physical reality? What is the form of basic
physical theory?
The answers to these questions depend crucially on the nature of physical
causation. Isaac Newton erected his theory gravity on the idea of instant
action at a distance. The idea was later banished from classical physics by
Einstein’s theory of relativity. However, the idea resurfaced at the quantum
level in the debate between Einstein and Bohr. Einstein objected to the
“mysterious action at a distance”, but Bohr defended “the necessity of a
final renunciation of the classical ideal of causality and a radical revision of
our attitude towards the problem of physical reality”[4].
The essence of this radical revision was explained by Dirac at the 1927
Solvay conference [5]. He insisted on the restriction of the application of
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quantum theory to our knowledge of a system, not to that system itself.
This view is encapsulated in Heisenberg’s famous statement [6]:
“The conception of the objective reality of the elementary particles has
thus evaporated not into the cloud of some obscure new reality concept, but
into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that represents no longer the
behaviour of the particle but rather our knowledge of this behaviour.”
This conception of quantum theory, espoused by Bohr, Dirac, and Heisen-
berg, is called the Copenhagen interpretation. It is essentially subjective and
epistemological, because the basic reality of the theory is ‘our knowledge’.
It may seem odd at first that such prominent physicists would propose
this radical revision of the nature of physical theory. But they seemed to
be forced to this subjective point of view by certain failures of normal ideas
about causation.
In actual practice, quantum theory often entails that an act of acquiring
knowledge in one place instantly changes the theoretical representation of
some faraway system. Physicists were—and are—reluctant to believe that
performing a nearby act can instantly change a faraway physical reality.
However, they know that “our knowledge” of a faraway system can instantly
change when we acquire knowledge about a nearby system, provided some
properties of two systems are known to be strongly correlated. For example,
if we know that two particles start at the same time from the origin of the
coordinate system, and subsequently travel with opposite velocities, then
finding one of these particles at the point (x, y, z) allows us to ‘know’ that
the other particle lies, at that same instant, at the point (−x,−y,−z). But
we do not imagine that the act of measuring the position of one particle
causes the other particle to be where it is. By analogy, the instantaneous
effects that automatically arise in quantum theory become less puzzling if
one restricts the applications of quantum theory to “our knowledge”, and
renounces all efforts to understand physical reality, except to the extent that
“physical reality” is identified with knowledge.
This way of dodging the locality problem was attacked by Einstein, Podol-
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sky, and Rosen in a famous paper [7] entitled: “Can quantum-mechanical
description of physical reality be considered complete?” Einstein and his
colleagues argue that the answer to this question is No, while Bohr argues
for the affirmative. Given the enormity of what must exist in the universe
that is not “our knowledge”, it is astonishing that, in the minds of most
physicists, Bohr has prevailed over Einstein in his claim that quantum the-
ory, in a form that is explicitly restricted in application to human knowledge,
can be considered to be a complete description of physical reality. This ma-
jority opinion stems, I believe, more from the lack of a promising alternative
candidate than from any decisive logical argument.
Einstein, commenting on the Copenhagen position, said: “What I dislike
about this kind of argument is the basic positivistic attitude, which from my
view is untenable, and seems to me to come to the same thing as Berkeley’s
principle, esse est percipi [9]. Many other scientists agree. For example,
Murray Gell-Mann [10] asserts: “Niels Bohr brainwashed a whole generation
into believing that the problem was solved fifty years ago”. Gell-mann has
been pursuing with James Hartle [11] an ambitious program, built on ideas of
Everett [12] and of Griffith [13], that aims to construct a quantum theory that
is more complete than the Copenhagen version. This effort, and others like
it, are fueled by the opinion that to integrate quantum theory into cosmology,
and to understand the evolutionary process that has produced creatures that
can have knowledge akin to “our knowledge”, one needs to have a theory of
the evolving reality in which those creatures are imbedded.
It is in this context of such efforts to construct a more complete theory
that the significance of the quantum nonlocality experiments lies. The point
is this: If nature really is nonlocal, as these experiments suggest, then there
is a simple theory of reality that encompasses both our knowledge and a real
objective physical world in which that knowledge is embedded. It describes
also the dynamical connection between these two aspects of reality. This
theory is obtained by combining relativistic quantum field theory with the
version of quantum theory developed by John von Neumann [14].
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All physical theories are, of course, provisional, and subject to future re-
vision or elaboration. But at a given stage in the development of science the
contending theories can be evaluated on many grounds, such as utility, par-
simony, predictive power, explanatory power, conceptual simplicity, logical
coherence, and aesthetic beauty. The relativistic version of von Neumann’s
theory fares well on all of these counts.
The essential difference between von Neumann quantum theory and Copen-
hagen quantum theory lies in the way measuring devices are treated. In the
Copenhagen approach, the measuring devices are excluded from the world
described in the mathematical language of quantum theory. The measur-
ing device are described, instead, by “the same means of communication
as the one used in classical physics” [15]. This approach renders the the-
ory pragmatically useful but physically obscure. It links the theory to “our
knowledge” of the measuring devices in a useful way, but upsets the unity
of the physical world. This tearing asunder of the physical world creates
huge theoretical problems, which are ducked in the Copenhagen approach by
renouncing man’s ability to understand reality.
The mathematical rules of quantum theory specify clearly how the mea-
suring devices are to be included in the quantum mechanically described
physical world. Von Neumann first formulates rigorously the mathematical
structure that quantum phenomena seem to force upon us, and then follows
where that mathematics leads. It leads first to the incorporation of the mea-
suring devices into the quantum mechanically described physical universe,
and eventually to the inclusion of everything built out of atoms and their con-
stiuents. Our bodies and brains thus become, in von Neumann’s approach,
parts of the quantum mechanically described physical universe. Treating the
entire physical universe in this unified way provides a conceptually simple
and logically coherent theoretical foundation. The Copenhagen alternative
of leaving out of this description parts of the physical universe that are in-
teracting with the parts retained severely disrupts the logical coherence of
the theoretical structure.
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Copenhagen quantum theory claims to be complete. That claim stems
from the fact that all of validated predictions of classical physical theory
can deduced from it, together with a host of quantum predictions, many
validated, and none known to fail. Bohr argues that all possible predictions
pertaining to connections between outcomes of human observations of the
devices that probe atomic systems are obtainable from Copenhagen quantum
theory.
Von Neumann quantum theory encompasses, in principle, all of the pre-
diction of Copenhagen quantum theory. It postulates, for each observer, that
each increment in his knowledge is connected to a corresponding ‘reduction’
of the state of his brain: the new reduced state is obtained from the old state
by eliminating all parts that are incompatible with his new knowledge. This
rule is a direct application, at the level of the brain of the observer, of the
rule that Copenhagen quantum theory applies at the level of the measuring
device, and the equivalence is the two formulations arises from the causal
connection that is needed to effect a good observation.
But von Neumann quantum theory gives, in principle, much more than
Copenhagen quantum theory can. By providing an objective description
of the entire history of the universe, rather than merely rules connecting
human observations, von Neumann’s theory provides a quantum framework
for cosmological and biological evolution. And by including the body and
brain of the observer as well as his knowledge, and also the dynamical laws
that connects these two realities, the theory provides a coherent framework
for understanding the relationship between mind and matter [16].
Von Neumann’s rules are, of course, expressed in neat mathematical form.
[See Box 1]
——————————————————————
Box 1: von Neumann Quantum Theory
The evolving state of the universe is represented by an operator S(t).
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The state of any subsystem, b, is represented by
Sb(t) = TrbS(t),
where Trb stands for the partial trace over all variables other than those that
define the subsystem b.
The system S(t) evolves between reductions via the equation
S(t+∆t) = exp(−iH∆t)S(t) exp(+iH∆t),
where H is the energy operator. Each reduction is associated with a quantum
information processor b and a projection operator P that acts like the identity
on all degrees of freedom other than those that define b. The reduction
proceeds in two steps. First a question is posed by the processor. This is
represented by the von Neumann process I: if S(t− 0) is the limit of S(t′) as
t′ approaches t from below then
S(t) = PS(t− 0)P + (1− P )S(t− 0)(1− P ).
Then nature chooses an answer, P = 1 or P = 0, according to the rule
S(t+ 0) = PS(t)P with probability TrPS(t)/TrS(t),
or
S(t+ 0) = (1− P )S(t)(1− P ) otherwise.
——————————————————————-
Reconciliation with Relativity
von Neumann quantum theory gives a logically simple mathematical de-
scription of an evolving physical world that is linked to human experiences
by specified dynamical equations. But there is one major problem: reconcil-
iation with the theory of relativity. This problem arises from the fact that
von Neumann formulated his theory in the nonrelativistic approximation.
The problem has two parts. The first is resolved by simply replacing the
nonrelativistic theory used by von Neumann with relativistic quantum field
theory. To deal with the link to human knowledge, and hence to the predic-
tions of Copenhagen quantum theory, one needs to consider human brains.
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Quantum electrodymamics is the relevant field theory, and the pertinent en-
ergy range is that of atomic and molecular interactions. I shall assume that
whatever high-energy theory eventually prevails in quantum physics, it will
reduce to quantum electrodynamics in this regime.
The second problem is this: von Neumann’s theory is built on the New-
tonian concept of the instants of time, ‘now’, each of which extends over all
space. The evolving state of the universe S(t) is defined to be the state of the
entire universe at the instant of time t. The formulations of relativistic quan-
tum field theories by Tomonaga [17] and Schwinger [18] have corresponding
spacelike surfaces σ. As Pauli once strongly emphasized to me, these sur-
faces, while they may give a certain aura of relativistic invariance, do not
differ significantly from the constant-time surfaces that appear in the nonrel-
ativistic approximation. Indeed, all efforts to eliminate from quantum theory
this preferred status of time have proved futile.
To obtain a relativistic version of von Neumann’s theory one needs to
identify von Neumann’s constant-time surfaces with certain special spacelike
surfaces σ of the formulations of Tomonaga and Schwinger. To achieve an
objective quantum theory of reality theory, these preferred instants now must
be objective features of nature.
Giving special physical status to a particular sequence of spacekike sur-
faces runs counter to certain ideas spawned by the theory of relativity. How-
ever, the astronomical data [19] indicates that there is a preferred sequence
of ‘nows’ that define spacelike surfaces in which, for the early universe, mat-
ter was distributed almost uniformly in density, mean local velocity, and
temperature.
I shall assume that there is a preferred advancing sequence of spatial
surfaces, and that in the early universe these surfaces are defined by the
cosmologically preferred frame.
Nonlocality and Relativity
This theory immediately accounts for the faster-than-light transfer of
information that seems to be entailed by the nonlocality experiments: the
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reduction of the state S(t) of the universe on the occasion of the earlier
of the two measurement, which (in the cited experiment) occurs in one of
the two villages, has, according to this theory, an immediate effect on the
evolving state S(t) of the universe, and hence an immediate effect also on the
propensities for the various possible outcomes of the measurement performed
slightly later in the other village.
Such an instantaneous transfer of information is widely held to be impos-
sible: it is believed to violate the precepts of the theory of relativity. But
does it?
The theory of relativity was originally formulated within classical physical
theory, and, in particular, for a deterministic theory. In that case the entire
history of the universe could be conceived to be laid out for all times in
a four-dimensional spacetime. The idea of “becoming”, or of the gradual
unfolding of reality, has no natural place in this deterministic conception of
the universe.
Quantum theory is a different kind of theory: it is formulated as an inde-
terministic theory. Determinism is relaxed in two ways. First of all, freedom
is granted to experimenters to chose which measurements they will perform.
Second, Nature is then required to choose the outcome of any experiment
that is actually performed, subject to statistical conditions. Nature is not
required to choose an outcome for a contemplated alternative possible exper-
iment that is not actually performed.
In view of these deep structural differences there is a question of prin-
ciple regarding how the idea of no faster-than-light transfer of information
should be carried over from the deterministic classical idealization to the
indeterministic quantum reality.
Relativistic quantum field theory is the canonical relativistic generaliza-
tion of nonrelativistic quantum theory. That theory has two key relativistic
properties: (1), All of its predictions about outcomes of measurements are
independent of the coordinate frame used to define the advancing sequence
of constant-time surfaces ‘now’; and (2), No signal can be transmitted faster
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than light. [A “signal” is a controllable transfer of information: it is a trans-
fer that allows a sequence of bits composed by a sender to be conveyed to
a receiver.] However, the theory explicity exhibits other transfers of infor-
mation that do not conform to the no-faster-than-light rule. These transfers
are associated with the reduction events. Within the theory these trans-
fers act instantaneously along the spatial slices of Tomonaga and Schwinger,
once this sequence of advancing constant-time surfaces σ is fixed. The locus
of these transfers can be shifted by shifting these surfaces, but, within the
theory, these transfers cannot be eliminated.
As mentioned above, the usual way of dealing with these explicit faster-
than-light-transfers in relativistic quantum field theory is to say that their
appearance shows that the theory cannot be interpreted realistically: the
theory must be about “our knowledge”, as Bohr and company claim, rather
that about reality itself. There is no puzzle about the fact that our knowledge
about a faraway system can suddenly change when we acquire here informa-
tion about some system that is strongly correlated with that far away system.
But it is maintained that reality itself cannot behave in this way.
That is indeed the widely held prejudice. But there is no theoretical or
empirical evidence that supports it. Indeed, both theory and the nonlocality
experiments appear to contradict it. It is thus a metaphysical prejudice with
no scientific basis. Scientific theories should be judged on the basis of the
criteria mentioned above, rather than on the basis of a pure metaphysical
prejudice. Renouncing our ability to understand the world around us is a
price too heavy to pay to preserve a mere prejudice.
If that metaphysical prejudice is wrong, then all of the contortions and
evasions and renunciations that characterize the subjective Copenhagen in-
terpretation can be discarded: one can reaffirm, with Einstein, the traditional
idea that we should pursue, without self-imposed limitations, our efforts to
understand the world around us and our connection to it: if that meta-
physical prejudice is wrong then we can return to the idea that the proper
goal of science is to understand the objectively existing reality of which ‘our
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knowledge’ is a tiny part.
Is Nonlocality Real?
The claim that von Neumann’s theory can describe objective reality rests
heavily on the assumption that nonlocality is real. But how strong is the
evidence for this? Is there really any credible evidence that information is
transferred over spacelike intervals?
The evidence is very strong that the predictions of quantum theory are
valid in these experiments involving pairs of measurementss performed at
essentially the same time in regions lying far apart. But the question is
this: Can we validly argue from the empirically supported premise that these
predictions of quantum theory are correct to the conclusion that nature must
transfer information over spacelike intervals?
The usual arguments for nonlocality stem from the work of John Bell
[20]. Pondering the issue debated by Einstein and Bohr, Bell proposed the
following approach: Assume that quantum theory is indeed incomplete, as
Einstein claimed, and hence that there are variables other than those that
appear in Copenhagen quantum theory. Then formulate a locality require-
ment in terms of these extra variables, which are then called “local hidden
variables”, and prove that the existence of such variables is incompatible
with the assumed validity of certain predictions of quantum theory.
Bell was able to prove such a contradiction. This proof showed, basically,
that Einstein was wrong: Einstein’s asssumption that quantum theory is
both incomplete and local is not viable.
But that sort of argument is no proof, or even indication, that quantum
theory is nonlocal. The more plausible conclusion, for quantum physicists, is
that nature is local, but that Einstein was wrong in claiming that quantum
theory is incomplete: the hidden-variable assumption is wrong.
Eliminating Hidden Variables
The argument of Bell is essentially different from that of Einstein, Podol-
sky, and Rosen. The former shows the ideas of Einstein cannot all be correct;
the latter aimed to show that the ideas of Bohr cannot all be correct.
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The problem faced by Einstein and his colleagues was to mount within
the quantum framework an argument that involved a consideration of possible
outcomes of alternative possible experiments. The difficulty is that quantum
philosophy explicity rejects the notion that the outcomes of two alternative
possible measurements are both physically well defined. Indeed, that limita-
tion was precisely the idea that Einstein and company wanted to challenge.
But then they had to mount an argument that dealt with alternative possible
measurements without contravening in their premises the very precept that
they were challenging.
Their strategy was to introduce the outcomes of alternative possible ex-
periments via a locality requirement on physical reality that seemed undeni-
able. The strategy succeeded: Bohr was forced into a very fragile position
that depended upon entangling physical reality with predictions, and hence
with knowledge:
“...an influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of
predictions regarding future behavior of the system. Since these conditions
constitute an inherent element of any phenomena to which the term ‘physi-
cally reality’ can be properly attached we see that the argument of mentioned
authors does not justify their conclusion that quantum-mechanical descrip-
tion is essentially incomplete.”[8]
I shall pursue here a strategy similar to that of Einstein and his colleagues,
and will be led to a conclusion similar to Bohr’s, namely that quantum
physical reality is entwined with knowledge, and does involve some subtle
sort of nonlocal influence.
I introduce alternative possibilities by combining two ideas embraced by
Copenhagen philosophy. The first of these is the freedom of experimenters
to choose which measurements they will perform. In Bohr’s words:
“The freedom of experimentation, presupposed in classical physics, is of
course retained and corresponds to the free choice of experimental arrange-
ments for which the mathematical structure of the quantum mechanical for-
malism offers the appropriate latitude.”[15]
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This assumption lies at the foundation for Bohr’s notion of complementar-
ity: some information about all the possible choices is simultaneously present
in the quantum state, and Bohr wants to provide the possibility that any one
of the mutually exclusive alternatives might be used. No matter which choice
the experimenter makes, the associated set of predictions is supposed to hold.
The second idea is the condition of no backward-in-time causation. Ac-
cording to quantum thinking, experimenters are to be considered free to
choose which measurement they will perform. Moreover, if an outcome of a
measurement appears to an observer at a time earlier than some time T , then
this outcome can be considered to have been fixed independently of which
experiment will be freely chosen and performed by another experimenter at
times later than T : the later choice is allowed go either way without dis-
turbing the outcome that has already appeared to observers earlier. For
whichever choice is eventually made at the later time, the relevant prediction
of quantum theory is supposed hold. This no-backward-in-time influence
condition is assumed to hold for at least one coordinate system (x,y,z,t).
These two conditions are, I believe, compatible with quantum thinking.
They contradict no quantum precept or combination of quantum predictions.
They, by themselves, lead to no contradiction. But they do involve the
contemplation of alternative possibilities, and provide the needed logical toe-
hold.
The Hardy Experimental Setup
To get a nonlocality conclusion like the one obtained from Bell-type the-
orems, but without contravening the precepts of quantum theory, it is eas-
iest to consider an experiment of the kind first discussed by Lucien Hardy
[21]. The setup is basically similar to the ones considered in proofs of Bell’s
theorem. There are two spacetime regions, L and R, that are “spacelike sep-
arated”. This condition means that the two regions are situated far apart in
space relative to their extensions in time, so that no point in either region
can be reached from any point in the other without moving either faster
than the speed of light or backward in time. This means also that in some
12
frame, which I take to be the coordinate system (x,y,z,t) mentioned above,
the region L lies at times greater than time T , and region R lies earlier than
time T .
In each region an experimenter freely chooses between two possible exper-
iments. Each experiment will, if chosen, be performed within that region, and
its outcomes will appear to observers within that region. Thus neither choice
can affect anything in the other region without there being some influence
that acts over a space-like interval.
The argument involves four predictions made by quantum theory under
the Hardy conditions. These conditions are described in Box 2.
——————————————————————–
Box 2: Predictions of quantum theory for the Hardy experi-
ment.
The two possible experiments in region L are labelled L1 and L2.
The two possible experiments in region R are labelled R1 and R2.
The two possible outcomes of L1 are labelled L1+ and L1-, etc.
The Hardy setup involves a laser down-conversion source that emits a pair
of correlated photons. The experimental conditions are such that quantum
theory makes four (pertinent) predictions:
1. If (L1,R2) is performed and L1- appears in L then R2+ must appear
in R.
2. If (L2,R2) is performed and R2+ appears in R then L2+ must appear in
L.
3. If (L2,R1) is performed and L2+ appears in L then R1- must appear in
R.
4. If (L1,R1) is performed and L1- appears in L then R1+ appears sometimes
in R.
The three words “must” mean that the specified outcome is predicted to
occur with certainty (i.e., probability unity).
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—————————————————————————
Two Simple Conclusions
It is easy to deduce from our assumptions two simple conclusions.
Recall that region R lies earlier than time T , and that region L lies later
than time T .
Suppose the actually selected pair of experiments is (R2, L1), and that
the outcome L1- appears in region L. Then prediction 1 of quantum theory
entails that R2+ must have already appeared in R prior to time T . The
no-backward-in-time-influence condition then entails that this outcome R2+
was fixed and settled prior to time T , independently of which way the later
free choice in L will eventually go: the outcome in region R at the earlier
time would still be R2+ even if the later free choice had gone the other way,
and L2 had been chosen instead of L1.
Under this alternative condition (L2,R2,R2+) the experiment L1 is not
performed, and there is no physical reality corresponding to its outcome. But
in this alternative case L2 is performed, and hence L2 must have an outcome.
Prediction 2 of quantum theory asserts that it must be L2+. This yields the
following conclusion:
Assertion A(R2):
If (R2,L1) is performed and outcome L1- appears in region L, then if
the choice in L had gone the other way, and L2, instead of L1, had been
performed in L then outcome L2+ would have appeared there.
Because we have two predictions that hold with certainty, and the two
strong assumptions of ‘free choice’ and ‘no backward causation’, it is not
surprising that we have been able to derive this conclusion. In an essentially
deterministic context we are often able to deduce from the outcome of one
measurement what would have happened if we had made, instead, another
measurement. If the actual outcome has a unique precondition, which leads
to a unique outcome of the alternative possible measurement then we can
draw a conclusion of this kind.
Consider next the same assertion, but with R2 replaced by R1:
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Assertion A(R1):
If (R1,L1) is performed and outcome L1- appears in region L, then if
the choice in L had gone the other way, and L2, instead of L1, had been
performed in L then outcome L2+ would have appeared there.
This assertion cannot be true. The fourth prediction of quantum theory
asserts that under the specified conditions, L1- and R1, the outcome R1+
appears sometimes in R. The no backward-in-time-influence condition en-
sures that this earlier fact would not be altered if the later choice in region
L had been L2. But A(R1) asserts that under this altered condition L2+
would appear in L. The third prediction then entails that R1- must always
appear in R. But that contradicts the earlier assertion that R1+ sometimes
appears in R.
The fact that A(R2) is true and A(R1) is false means that the choice made
in region R between R2 and R1 converts from necessarily true to necessarily
false a statement whose truth or falsity is determined wholly by connections
between possible events located in a region L that is spacelike separated
from the region R where the choice between R2 and R1 is made. This is
a theoretical constraint on any model that satisfies the assumptions of the
proof. It means that any model that satisfies these assumptions must have
some way of transferring information from region R to region L.
Stated more physically, our assumptions entail the existence of a con-
straint connecting the outcomes that nature can choose in region L under
the different conditions that the experimenter in region L can choose to set
up there, and this constraint takes one or the other of two incompatible forms
depending on whether the experimenter in region R chooses to perform ex-
periment R1 or R2.
It can be concluded that any model of nature that conforms to the predic-
tions and general precepts of quantum theory embodied in our assumptions
must accomodate tranfers of information over spacelike intervals. Hence the
presence of such transfers in a putative objective theory of reality not only
does not disqualify the theory, but constitutes, rather, a necessary property:
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any theory of reality that satisfies the assumptions of the proof must provide
for tranfers of information of the kind demanded by the proof.
The physical basis of the argument is the set four predictions of quantum
theory. Although the derivation of these predictions involves quantum enti-
ties, such as photons, it is only the predictions themselves, not their deriva-
tion, that enter into the argument. These predictions are about large-scale
experiments and large scale outcomes. Thus the argument itself is expressed
completely in terms of big things. It shows that certain classical ideas about
causation cannot be maintained for big objects separated by large distances.
The World as Knowledge
The objective quantum theory discussed here rejects the Copenhagen
renunciation of our ability to understand the objective sources of our knowl-
edge. But it accepts many other Copenhagen precepts. It conforms to Bohr’s
claim of “the necessity of a final renunciation of the classical ideal of causal-
ity and a radical revision of our attitude towards the problem of physical
reality”: the nonlocal transfers violate the “the classical ideal of causality”,
and the conception of physical reality is radically altered.
To appreciate the nature of this alteration note that the key physical
process involves the posing and answering of question with two allowed an-
swers, P = 1 and P = 0. Thus the basic dynamical process is informational
in character. The dynamics involves two kinds of choices that are indeter-
ministic, at the present stage of theoretical development. Each quantum
processor chooses questions, and nature chooses the answers. These answers
are stored in the evolving physical reality S(t). This stored compendium of
discrete answers has causal power: S(t) specifies the propensities for the pos-
ing and answering of future questions. Once the physical world is understood
as a stored compendium of locally efficacious bits of knowledge, the instant
transfers can be understood in terms of changes in “knowledge”.
In the Copenhagen interpretation the pertinent knowledge was “our knowl-
edge”: it was conscious human knowledge of the kind we can describe and
communicate to other human beings. This knowledge is the foundation of
16
human science. Von Neumann was concerned with this kind of knowledge,
because he needed to show that his theory could generate the predictions of
Copenhagen quantum theory. Although human beings, and human knowl-
edge, play, therefore, a special role in the theory in its present state of histor-
ical development, our species should play no special role in a truly objective
description of nature. Von Neumann’s theory has, accordingly, been for-
mulated here in terms of the more general concept of quantum information
processors, of which human beings are the paradigmatic examples. However,
other creatures and physical systems cannnot excluded, a priori, and the con-
cept of “knowledge” will eventually need to be developed [9] to accommodate
the precursors of human knowledge, namely the more primitive forms from
which human knowledge emerged.
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